China’s rise in English School perspective by Buzan, Barry
  
Barry Buzan 
China’s rise in English School perspective 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Buzan, Barry (2018) China’s rise in English School perspective. International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific, 18 (3). pp. 449-476. ISSN 1470-482X 
 
DOI: 10.1093/irap/lcy005 
 
© 2018 The Author 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90483/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
  1 
 
China’s Rise in English School Perspective 
Barry Buzan 
LSE  
b.g.buzan@lse.ac.uk  
Rev. 3 for IRAP 
February 2018 
[Abstract,article text, notes and references = 9955 words] 
 
Barry Buzan is a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS, Emeritus Professor in the LSE 
Department of International Relations, Honorary Professor at Copenhagen, 
Jilin, and China Foreign Affairs Universities, and a Fellow of the British 
Academy. Among his books are From International to World Society? (2004); 
co-edited with Rosemary Foot, Does China Matter? (2004); with Lene Hansen, 
The Evolution of International Security Studies (2009); co-edited with Amitav 
Acharya, Non-Western International Relations Theory (2010); An Introduction 
to the English School of International Relations (2014); co-edited with Yongjin 
Zhang Contesting International Society in East Asia, (2014); with George 
Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of 
International Relations. He is working, with Evelyn Goh on History Problems 
and Historical Opportunities: Rethinking Sino-Japanese Alienation; and with 
Yongjin Zhang on China and the Transformation of International Society: 
Power, Institutions and Order. 
 
Abstract 
This chapter looks at English School (ES) theory as a way of understanding 
China and its rise. It focuses both on where ES theory fits well enough with 
China to provide an interesting perspective, and on where ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ put China outside the standard ES framing and raise 
theoretical challenges to it. The first section briefly reviews the ES literature on 
China. The second section places China within the normative structure of 
contemporary global international society by looking at how China relates to 
the primary institutions that define that society. The third section explores two 
challenges that ‘Chinese characteristics’ pose for how the ES thinks about 
international society: hierarchy and ‘face’. The Conclusions assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of ES theory in relation to understanding the rise of 
China. 
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Introduction 
 
The idea behind this paper is that the English School (ES) provides a 
distinctive perspective on China’s rise, and offers particular insights into the 
question of whether and how China is a status quo or revisionist power. The 
English School’s main concern is to differentiate international society (a social 
structure) from international system (a material structure), and to focus on the 
former. Its principal analytical tool is the concept of primary institutions, 
understood as deep, evolved practices shared amongst states (and other 
political actors) and defining the criteria for both membership of, and legitimate 
behaviour within, the society of states. Primary institutions include sovereignty, 
diplomacy, international law, territoriality, nationalism, and several more, and 
are contrasted with the secondary institutions (instrumental, designed regimes 
and intergovernmental organizations) studied by liberal institutionalists. 
Primary institutions constitute the normative framing of international society 
and can be studied either normatively or structurally. States are thus 
embedded in an international society of their own making, and the degree of 
order within that society can vary across a spectrum from a thin pluralist logic 
of coexistence (e.g. 18th century Europe) to a thick solidarist logic based on 
shared values and institutionalized cooperation (e.g. the European Union). 
Unlike secondary institutions, which only appeared in the late 19th century, 
primary ones date back to the beginnings of civilization. In this paper I will use 
primary institutions as the principal lens through which to examine the rise of 
China. 1  
 
The ES is thus in once sense a historical approach, interested in comparative 
and evolutionary international society. But given its unique set of concepts, it is 
also a theoretical approach.2 The main claim of the ES to theoretical status is 
that it sets out a distinctive picture of what the international system/society 
looks like, and a novel taxonomy of what it is that IR should be taking as its 
principal objects of study. Because taxonomy identifies what it is that is to be 
theorised about, it is absolutely foundational to any theoretical enterprise. The 
English School offers concepts (international society, primary institutions) and 
debates (pluralism/solidarism) that are not available through materialist, 
system-based, approaches to IR. The ES does not, for the most part, offer a 
hypothesis-testing approach. Its method is to apply its distinctive taxonomy to 
a mainly historical analysis. 
 
                                                 
1 For an introduction to the English School and its concepts, see Buzan (2014a). On primary 
institutions see in addition: Bull (1977); Holsti (2004); Buzan (2004: 161-204); Hurrell (2007); 
Schouenborg (2011). 
2 The main discussion on the ES as theory is Navari (2009). 
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Within the ES perspective, China can be addressed both in static terms ( 
locating China within the normative structure of international society at any 
given time), and dynamic ones, (interactions between China and international 
society and how they shape each other over time). Within that, it is also about 
locating China not only within global international society (GIS, when that 
exists) but also international society at the regional level (when that exists). In 
what follows, I use these approaches to follow two lines of questioning: first, 
where does the ES fits well enough with China to provide an interesting 
perspective on its rise; and second, where do ‘Chinese characteristics’ put 
China outside the standard ES framing and so raise theoretical challenges to 
it? The first section briefly reviews the ES literature on China over the main 
periods of Chinese history. The second section places China within the 
normative structure of contemporary GIS by looking at how China relates to 
the primary institutions that define that society, and what this tells us about the 
debate over whether or not China is a status quo or a revisionist power. The 
third section explores two challenges that ‘Chinese characteristics’ pose both 
for policy-makers and for how the ES thinks about international society: 
hierarchy and ‘face’. The Conclusions assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of ES theory in relation to understanding the rise of China. The paper 
necessarily covers a lot of ground. It aims to set out an overview of what China 
looks like in ES perspective, and what challenges China poses for ES 
taxonomies. 
 
China in English School Perspective 
 
The ES literature on China focuses on four different periods: the ‘Spring and 
Autumn and Warring States’ (770-221 BC); the classical ‘tribute system’ (221 
BC- 1895); the ‘encounter’ with expanding Western GIS (1840-1945); which 
overlapped with the final decades of the tribute system, and Communist 
China’s evolving relationship with GIS (1949-present).3 The Communist period 
divides into two distinct parts: the Maoist, revolutionary one, when China was 
largely alienated from, and oppositional to, the US-dominated GIS; and the one 
since the late 1970s, when China rejoined what was a more globalised, but still 
US-led, GIS. These different historical timings generate different points of 
interest for the ES. In the first period, China appears as a distinctive form of 
international society in itself. In the second, it was the core of a distinctive 
regional international society. In the third, it appears as an object in the 
encounter with Western-colonial international society when China was 
struggling, and mainly failing, to adapt to, and gain status within, a Western-
defined modern ‘standard of civilization’. In the last period, China appears as 
an increasingly powerful outlier in Western-GIS, albeit one that has moved 
                                                 
3 For elaboration and sources on the ES literature on China, see the discussion in Buzan 
(2010: 8-16). 
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from participating first as a revolutionary challenger; then being a conservative 
status quo power, supportive of pluralist institutions but resistant to solidarist 
ones; and now seeming to be moving towards a more assertive form of 
reformist revisionism. Since 1840 China has been consistent in wanting to 
increases its status within GIS, but has been quite changeable about whether 
it supported or opposed the institutions of that society, whether individually or 
the whole set. 
 
During the 19th century, China was quickly and harshly pushed from being an 
empire to being a state, and from constituting the core of an East Asian 
regional international society to being part of the periphery of a Western-global 
one (Gong, 1984; Suzuki, 2009a). With its forced induction into the Western 
states-system, China ceased to be a provider of non-Western models of 
international society, and became mainly an object in the encounter with 
Western-colonial international society. During the Maoist period, China was 
largely alienated from international society, partly by its own revolutionary 
ideology, and partly by being denied a seat in the UN, and having restricted 
diplomatic recognition. This began to change with the rapprochement with the 
US in the 1970s, and a more pragmatic leadership in China after the death of 
Mao. Zhang sees China from the late 1970s as steadily integrating with GIS, 
playing the diplomatic apprentice rather than the revolutionary, and mainly 
engaging economically (Zhang, 1998: 73-91). But China was chasing a moving 
target, and in danger of becoming alienated again as liberal agendas in the 
West, such as human rights and ‘good governance’ created a new ‘standard of 
civilisation’, putting pressure on its quite successful adoption of Westphalian 
standards and institutions (Foot, 2006).  Just as in the first round of China’s 
encounter with Western international society, China did not accept the need to 
Westernise itself completely, but sought to find a stable and workable blend of 
modernising reforms and ‘Chinese characteristics’. 
 
China has made major strides in pursuit of economic integration into the 
Western-led world economy, most notably its membership of the WTO. It has 
made some contributions to peacekeeping (Suzuki, 2009b) and non-
proliferation, but politically its position has until recently been relatively 
marginal. Although accorded great power status, as the only ideologically 
committed non-democracy amongst the leading states it is uncomfortable with 
many aspects of the US-dominated political order. It has tended to be fairly 
passive in the UNSC, and concerned mainly to protect its domestic interests. It 
is defensive about human rights and democracy, and until recently, also about 
environmental issues. Along with many other East Asian countries, it has 
strong and frequently repeated views about sovereignty and the right of non-
intervention, though there are some signs, including its participation in PKOs, 
that its hard view is softening as its global position becomes deeper, more 
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complex, and more nuanced (Huang and Shih, 2014). It has experienced some 
political and diplomatic setbacks, most obviously in the reactions to the events 
in Tiananmen Square in 1989, to the question of Tibet generally, and most 
recently in the July 2016 decision on the South China Sea case by the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration of the International Court of Justice. There are 
also some specific areas of international cooperation, such as space science, 
from which China has been largely excluded. Zhang, X (2011) argues that 
China has benefited from the existing GIS despite being out of tune with the 
emergent liberal solidarist turn towards human rights and democracy. Zhang, Y 
(2015) argues that the key question now is how China and the US renegotiate 
what constitutes legitimacy for the great power club. The G20 meeting in 
Hangzhou in 2016 stimulated a discourse in China around ‘global governance’ 
which perhaps signaled an interest in becoming a responsible great power. 
 
As I will show in the next section, in many ways China accepts the existing 
norms and rules of GIS, but in relation to Western standards of human rights 
and democracy, it is an outlier.  
 
China in the Normative Structure of a Decentring Global International 
Society 
 
China’s relationship with contemporary international society can be quite 
substantially captured by looking at how it relates to the structure of primary 
institutions, where there is a pretty clear pattern of which such institutions 
China accepts and which it doesn’t.4 When China was an object in the 
encounter with Western-colonial international society its views on primary 
institutions did not matter much to others. More attention was paid to China’s 
views during its revolutionist, Maoist, phase, but not that much more, because 
China was both politically extreme and relatively weak. Since the 1990s, 
however, China’s views about the normative structure of GIS have become 
increasingly important. China has become partly integrated with GIS, and as its 
material power has pushed it into the top ranks, so the power of the US has 
gone into relative (but not absolute) decline. The assumption behind the 
argument in this section is that we are heading into a post-Western world of 
deep pluralism (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018). This will not be a world of  
bipolar superpower competition between China and the US, but one of several 
great and many regional powers, but no superpowers. India is also becoming a 
great power, and many countries, including Mexico, South Korea, Turkey and 
Vietnam are becoming regional powers. Because many are rising – what 
Zakaria (2009) calls ‘the rise of the rest’ – deep pluralism will be defined not 
only by the diffusion of wealth and power, but also by a decline in the liberal 
                                                 
4 For surveys of these institutions see Buzan (2014a: 134-63); Holsti (2004). 
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‘standard of civilisation’ and the diffusion of cultural authority and legitimacy to 
more civilizations: Hindutva, Islamic values, ‘Chinese characteristics’, and so 
forth. While the West (and Japan) will remain strong, it will no longer be 
dominant in either material or ideational terms. China is, and will remain, in the 
top ranks of powers, but it will not become a superpower for two reasons. First, 
because the conditions of deep pluralism will not allow any state to achieve (or 
in the case of the US maintain) the relative material power necessary to be a 
superpower. And second, because the ideational primacy enjoyed by the West 
for two centuries is eroding, and there is no sign of any other universal 
ideology that might replace it and provide legitimacy for a superpower role. 
 
In what follows I will present necessarily brief assessments of China’s 
perspective on four groups of primary institutions: those that have become 
obsolete during the last two centuries; the classical, mainly pluralist, 
‘Westphalian’ institutions; new institutions that have come into play during the 
19th and 20th centuries; and institutions that are, depending on one’s point of 
view, either emerging or contested. By ‘China’s perspective’, I mean mainly the 
official view of the party/state. It is certainly true that within China there is a 
wide spectrum of views, and many internal debates, on how the country should 
assess the international system/society, what position it should take within it, 
and what its foreign policy should be. Shambaugh (2013: 13-44) for example, 
charts a spectrum of positions within China’s foreign policy debates ranging 
from nativists and realists at one end of the spectrum to selective 
multilateralists and globalists at the other. He and many others think that the 
centre of gravity of China’s debates lies towards the nativist/realist end of the 
spectrum, but policy can change if one school or another happens to catch the 
leadership’s ear. Although Chinese politics are famously opaque, the current 
policy in Beijing of clamping down on critical voices suggests that there is now 
less room for this kind of influence than in the past.  
 
Over the nearly seven decades since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
took power, the details of China’s foreign policy have been consistently 
inconsistent, blowing hot and cold not only on relations with the US, Russia, 
Japan, India and most of China’s smaller neighbours, but also on issues 
ranging from the global market economy, through nuclear proliferation, to 
environmental stewardship (see: Garver, 2016). China’s foreign policy, like that 
of most states, has been mostly self-interested, but since China has changed 
so much internally over the past seven decades what those interests are has 
also changed. Whether this zig-zag habit also applies to China and the deeper 
level of the primary institutions of international society is one of the questions I 
hope to answer.  
 
Obsolete Institutions 
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China is strongly supportive of the delegitimation and obsolescence of three 
institutions that played a strong role in international society before 1945: 
dynasticism, imperialism/colonialism, and human inequality. The party/state, 
and much of the Chinese population, have nothing but contempt for the weak 
and decadent Qing dynasty that failed both to modernise China and defend it 
against foreign powers. The CCP is therefore happy with the way in which 
nationalism largely displaced dynasticism as the main source of political 
legitimacy during the 19th century (Mayall, 1990; Hughes, 2006). The CCP 
makes great play of the ‘century of humiliation’ inflicted on China by imperialist 
powers, and likes to exaggerate its own role in the struggle of the Chinese 
people against foreign aggressors. Its rhetoric has been strong on anti-
imperialism. It also cultivates memory of the racist attitudes of the West and 
the Japanese towards China, and the physical suffering and debasement of 
the Chinese people resulting from being treated as unequal by foreign powers. 
It is therefore entirely happy with the collapse of these two institutions after 
1945. These are stable positions and likely to remain so. Only if China revived 
its traditional hierarchical thinking and aimed for some form of overt primacy or 
suzerainty in East Asia might its anti-imperialism come into question. And only 
if the CCP followed North Korea down the path of dynastic communism would 
it have to reconsider its rejection of dynasticism. 
 
Classical ‘Westphalian’ Institutions 
 
China is also broadly happy with the classical, pluralist, ‘Westphalian’ set of 
institutions that came out of early-modern European international society: 
sovereignty and non-intervention, territoriality, balance of power, great power 
management, war, international law, and diplomacy. This set derives from 
Bull’s (1977: 53-71) conception of society, coming out of a kind of sociological 
functionalism in which all human societies must be founded on rules of 
coexistence about security against violence, observance of agreements, and 
property rights.  
 
China takes a famously strong view on the rights of sovereignty and non-
intervention, claiming not only a robust form of both for itself, but also that it 
observes the same principles in its relations with others. The CCP uses these 
institutions generally to defend Chinese cultural distinctiveness, and 
specifically to defend its own claim to eternal and exclusive rule against any 
external pressures for democratisation and human rights. China takes a highly 
conservative, pluralist view of sovereignty and non-intervention: that these 
principles are designed to enable nations to protect themselves, and cultivate 
their cultural and political distinctiveness within the boundaries of the state. In 
line with that, and despite having earlier settled some of its border disputes 
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with fraternal neighbours, China now also takes a strong view on territoriality. 
Part of the CCP’s self-defined remit is to reunite the country, and this is 
interpreted not only as being about Taiwan, but also about a host of contested 
islands, rocks and reefs in the East and South China Seas (Hayton, 2014), and 
about some contested land borders, most notably with India (Garver, 2016: 
146-62, 435-44, 734-57). China’s behaviour in this regard conforms with 
Mayall’s (1990: 57-63; 2000: 84. See also Chen, 2015 locs. 917-1022) 
observation that nationalism causes states to sacralise territory, and make 
even small and materially inconsequential territorial disputes into core issues 
of national pride and security.  
 
China seems also to be a firm supporter of the balance of power. Its 
longstanding rhetoric about anti-hegemonism, and for a more multipolar world, 
are not just anti-American, but leave balance of power as its default position. 
Its more recent call for a ‘new form of great power relations’ also suggests 
balance of power, though pointing as well to the closely related institution of 
great power management (GPM). On GPM, however, China’s position is more 
ambiguous. It certainly does not want hegemonic GPM by a US unipole, but 
whether it wants a collective form of GPM, or just the right of a great power to 
take primacy in its own region, is less clear. Like India, China accompanies its 
claim to great power status with a demand that it also retain its status as a 
developing country. This combination is then used to argue that it should not 
be burdened by GPM responsibilities, because its own development, 
incorporating a significant percentage of humankind, is as much of a 
contribution as it can manage. Despite its substantial contributions to 
peacekeeping operations, China’s behaviour as a great power is mainly self-
interested, and not much committed to international norms (Kissinger 2011; 
Shambaugh, 2013: 7, 152-5). Its commitment to non-intervention is a useful 
prop for this hands-off policy. China seldom makes explicit its desire for 
regional primacy, but its recent bullying behaviour towards its East Asian 
neighbours, and some of its rhetoric can be interpreted in that way. The 
notorious remark by its foreign minister Yang Jiechi at an ASEAN meeting in 
2010 that: ‘China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and 
that’s just a fact’ seemed to let the mask slip (Scobell and Harold, 2013: 121). 
 
Unlike during the Mao period, China now broadly adheres to the practices and 
conventions of both diplomacy and international law. Like many other states it 
often disputes the particular content and interpretation of international law. Its 
sovereigntist and anti-colonial rhetoric also likes to point out that China and 
many other non-Western peoples had no voice in the making of much 
international law. Yet neither reason amounts to a rejection of the principle that 
there should be international law, and that states should observe it. Post-Mao 
China has become comfortable with not only bilateral but also multilateral 
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diplomacy. It also seems happy with the idea of multilateral institutions, though 
like others it is unhappy with its status and influence in those set up by the 
Western powers. China’s position on the institution of war seems fairly 
traditional and pluralist. It certainly, and robustly, supports its right to self-
defence. It explicitly claims the right to war to prevent the secession of Taiwan, 
and more implicitly takes the same view of its other territorial disputes related 
to territorial ‘reunification’. China broadly goes along with the US’s post-2001 
extension of the right to war in relation to dealing with terrorism. 
 
Whether this seemingly firm set of positions is stable depends partly on how it 
interacts with the revival of Confucian thinking about hierarchy, on which more 
in the section below on ‘Chinese characteristics’.  
 
Newer Institutions 
 
China is also broadly comfortable with the four new primary institutions that 
have emerged and consolidated during the 19th and 20th century: nationalism, 
development, the market, and human equality. Since the ideological 
turnaround in the late 1970s, the CCP has cultivated nationalism as a 
replacement for the class-struggle line of Mao’s era. The Party has re-cast 
itself as the defender of the nation, and carefully cultivated ‘patriotic education’ 
to bolster its legitimacy (Gries, 2004; Hughes, 2006; Wang, 2008, 2012: 95-
118; Schell and Delury, 2013: 307). It has some internal tension between a 
narrow, ethnic ‘Han’ interpretation of nationalism and a more inclusive, civic, 
‘Chinese’ one that incorporates Tibetans, Uighers, Mongolians, Manchus and 
other non-Han minorities (Duara, 1995: locs. 444-656, 866-1092), but is firmly 
committed to the institution in general. It is also firmly wedded to the principle 
of human equality (anti-racism) as the converse of its strong rejection of racism 
and human inequality discussed above. 
 
The CCP is a strong proponent of development and modernization. This was 
true even in the Maoist period, when the Party warred against tradition and 
tried to leapfrog the country into modernity, though in that phase its policies for 
doing so were often counterproductive (Gray, 2002; Dikötter, 2011). It also 
represents continuity with the KMT government from the 1920s to the 1940s, 
which was also strongly committed to development, though unable to 
accomplish much because of both civil war and Japanese invasion. Since 
Deng’s ‘reform and opening up’, development has occupied a central place in 
the Party’s platform. A more market-orientated economics replaced the failed 
Marxist economic model, and delivering prosperity to the people became, 
along with nationalism, the main prop for the CCP’s legitimacy. This 
combination has proved to be a successful formula, captured in the slogan: 
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‘No CCP, no new China’. As noted above, China still claims to be a developing 
country, and takes the goals of development very seriously.  
 
The CCP’s attitude towards the market is somewhat more opaque. Given that 
it still thinks of itself as communist, it seems implausible that many, if any, of 
the CCP’s leaders actually believe in the market as a preferred way of 
organizing the economy. Since Deng, the dominant factions within the CCP 
have certainly made an instrumental calculation that the market is the best way 
for China (and themselves) to pursue wealth and power. But this calculated 
approach does not make them converts to liberal economic ideology in the way 
one would find in Britain and the US, and is therefore perhaps best seen as 
conditional. Even a calculated acceptance of the market has, however, 
required China to entangle itself in the web of intergovernmental organisations 
that are intrinsic to the operation of a global market economy. The commitment 
to the market has drawn China into the more solidarist aspects of 
contemporary GIS, and this creates tensions with its strong views on 
sovereignty, non-intervention and territoriality discussed above. China’s 
hesitation over allowing its currency to float is but one example of these 
tensions. Despite the pressures of the global economic crisis from 2008, China 
has remained committed to developing its own version of authoritarian 
capitalism (McNally, 2012; Buzan and Lawson, 2014). It remains, however, a 
very interesting question what the CCP would do if pursuit of the market 
seemed to be threatening its grip on power. 
 
Despite that uncertainty, China’s commitment to all four of these newer 
institutions looks firm. The commitment to nationalism, human equality and 
development is deeply embedded in both the party and the country. The 
commitment to the market may be more superficial and contested, but will 
probably be durable because the Party’s legitimacy rests on its ability to 
generate wealth and power, and there is as yet no plausible alternative to 
capitalism for doing this. 
 
Emerging/Contested Institutions 
 
It is mainly in the area of emerging or contested primary institutions – 
democracy, human rights, and environmental stewardship – that the CCP is in 
basic opposition, if not to the principles themselves, then certainly to the 
dominant Western interpretations of them. But because these institutions are 
not consensual across GIS, China is not alone in its opposition to them. The 
clearest way to see this is that these three institutions are being promoted 
mainly from the liberal West. They are promoted as universal values, and 
many of their supporters believe them to be emerging institutions of GIS. But 
their opponents reject this view, seeing them as unwanted projections of 
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Western values, and therefore not as ‘emergent’, but just as contested, finding 
support in some sections of GIS but not in others. This framing is most clearly 
applicable to democracy and human rights. While the CCP accepts economic 
liberalism as necessary to its survival, it cannot do the same with the political 
and social elements of liberalism: the former threatens its monopoly on political 
power, the latter threatens China’s traditional cultural preference for the group 
over the individual. Western conceptions of democracy and human rights are 
an existential issue for the CCP (and also for other authoritarian governments), 
and China’s strong line on sovereignty, non-intervention and territoriality are 
precisely designed as defences against them. If there is one thing that can be 
said with certainty about the CCP it is that its first priority is the preservation of 
its own power. There could be no clearer evidence for this than that the 
constitutional task of the PLA is to defend the Party, not the country (Harris, 
2014: loc. 850). 
 
Environmental stewardship is somewhat different. Although it may initially have 
been promoted from the West as a universal value, it is not part of liberal 
ideology, and is increasingly being seen as a shared-fate problem facing all of 
humankind. It is a relatively new idea, yet has already become an institution of 
GIS rather than a value held by one ideological camp, and seems to be holding 
firm despite the defection of the Trump administration (Falkner and Buzan, 
2017). China was initially opposed to international measures to address 
climate change, taking the view common amongst developing countries that it 
was the Western countries that had created this problem, and so it was their 
responsibility to pay for cleaning it up. But as environmental issues, particularly 
air and water pollution, and water shortages, have risen up the agenda of 
China’s domestic politics, and China has become the biggest carbon emitter, 
the CCP seems to be moving towards a more accepting attitude towards 
environmental stewardship. Although it still applies the principles of strong 
sovereignty, non-intervention and territoriality to environmental issues, its 
performance at the Paris climate change conference in 2015 was altogether 
more constructive than at an earlier conference in Copenhagen in 2009 
(Falkner, 2016). 
 
This survey of how China relates to the primary institutions of contemporary 
GIS throws interesting light on the argument about whether it is a status quo or 
a revisionist power. In ES perspective, two different factors are in play in this 
distinction: first, whether a country is happy with its status or rank in 
international society, and second, whether it accepts or contests the 
institutions that compose international society. Status quo powers are 
generally happy with both the rules and the status distribution of the prevailing 
international society. Revisionist powers come in three gradients. They can be 
revolutionary revisionist, wanting to change both the rules and the status 
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hierarchy, and prepared to resort to fair means or foul. Or they can be reformist 
revisionist, pursuing changes in the rules, but doing so mainly within the 
existing diplomatic framework of international society. Or they can be orthodox 
revisionist, generally happy with the rules, but wanting changes in the 
distribution of status (Buzan, 2007 [1991]: 237-46). China under Mao was a 
revolutionary revisionist power, but since Deng has adopted a much more 
moderate line.  
 
At the global level, some observers, both Chinese and American, have claimed 
that China is a status quo power (Johnston, 2003; Qin, 2003; Feng, 2008; Pan, 
2008). The case for this, as is evident from the survey above, is that China 
actually does support nearly all of the accepted institutions of GIS, and does 
so in a conservative way. Its main resistance is to human rights and 
democracy, which it sees as being mainly Western values. China is 
uncomfortable with the predominantly Western world society/global civil 
society, with which it does not deal well, and which as Clark (2007) argues is a 
key driver of the normative deepening of international society: democracy, 
human rights, environment (see also Buzan, 2018). From the CCP’s 
perspective, it is the liberal West that is aggressively revisionist, seeking to 
impose its liberal values on the rest of the world. The flaw in the status quo 
designation is that while China broadly accepts the institutional structure of 
GIS, it certainly wants to increase its status, which makes post-Deng China at 
least orthodox revisionist. A case could be made that under Xi Jinping, China 
is moving towards reformist revisionism, wanting at least to make changes to 
practices within great power management and the market (Yan, 2014). 
 
How China fits into an East Asian regional international society is difficult to 
judge. A recent study of this concludes that it is impossible to identify such a 
society with any clarity because the main feature of the discourse about it is a 
deep dispute between proponents of a narrower, more Asianist, view on the 
one hand, and a wider, more West-friendly view on the other (Buzan and 
Zhang, 2014). China champions the narrow view as part of its defence against 
democracy and human rights. 
 
This analysis might seem to be forcing China into a Western-defined set of 
categories, and up to a point that is true. But I do not think that even from a 
Chinese perspective there would be much ground for challenging the 
assessment that under the KMT China was broadly orthodox revisionist, under 
Mao firmly revolutionary revisionist, under Deng somewhere between status 
quo and orthodox revisionist, and under Xi moving towards reformist 
revisionist. Until China provides its own vision of GIS, which it has so far 
conspicuously failed to do (Kerr, 2015), there is no other standard by which to 
assess it. One can, however, identify some ‘Chinese characteristics’ that might 
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play both into defining such a vision and shaping the nature of China’s 
revisionism within GIS. 
 
‘Chinese Characteristics’ as Challenges for English School Theory 
 
This section explores two challenges that ‘Chinese characteristics’ pose for 
how the ES thinks about international society: hierarchy and ‘face’. As Tudor 
(2012: 42-52) notes, all of the societies in Northeast Asia have broadly 
Confucian roots that still play strongly in their contemporary values and 
behaviours, not least in their disposition towards hierarchical social relations 
and their concerns about ‘face’. Neither hierarchy nor ‘face’has been taken into 
account in ES theories. There is some allowance for hierarchy in ES theory, 
but none for ‘face’. Deep ‘Chinese characteristics’ are re-emerging in China’s 
behaviour. As China grows stronger, these will matter more and more to its 
foreign policy, especially in the region, if China seeks primacy there, but also 
globally, because China cannot de-link Asia from the concerns of other great 
powers (Buzan, 2017). 
 
Hierarchy 
 
The classical Chinese order operated within a hierarchical belief system 
(Tianxia) which extended Confucian relational logic to ‘all under heaven’. As 
Chen (2015: loc. 842) notes, sovereignty was forced on China under highly 
adverse circumstances during the 19th century, displacing its traditional Tianxia 
way of thinking. The hypocrisy of this has not been forgotten, and Tianxia 
thinking has remained alive in the background. Under Tianxia, some state 
(generally China, though others such as Vietnam and Japan also made bids) 
was the suzerain and the core of high civilisation. Power considerations were 
of course relevant to establishing and maintaining hierarchical relations, but 
they were not its main foundation (Zhang, Y. 2001; Suzuki, 2009a: 34-55; 
Zhang and Buzan, 2012; Zhang, F, 2009, 2014). An example of this is Korea 
looking down on the Qing as barbarians, and preferring to hold to Ming 
practices as culturally superior, even while having to deal with Qing power 
(Swope, 2009: 41-2). After 1911, the Chinese imperial system was abandoned. 
Under US primacy after 1945, neither China nor Japan has possessed either 
the cultural basis or the relative power to reassert ‘Middle Kingdom’ status 
claims. By contrast, the European system was more based on the principle of 
sovereign equality (anarchy) even though there was continuous contestation 
for hegemony within Europe. Within China an effort is emerging to promote 
some of the principles from this Confucian order as a more collectivist, 
harmonious alternative to the conflictual individualism of most Western IR 
thinking (Song, 2001: 70; Yan, 2001: 37-8; Yan, 2008; Zhao, 2006; Li, 2008). 
Harris (2014: locs. 362-74, 1289) puts a lot of emphasis on the importance of 
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hierarchy in China’s worldview: ‘China sees the world in a different way than 
countries in the West, for various reasons, but mostly because of the 
Confucian belief in hierarchy’.  
 
The basic Confucian model is rooted in a hierarchical family structure similar to 
that in many traditional agrarian civilizations in which fathers, brothers, sons, 
wives etc. stand in status relations of dominant/inferior to each other, and 
these relationships are mediated by the degree of intimacy/distance (Hwang, 
2011: 109-10, 199). As Fei (1992) notes: ‘the distinction between the senior 
and the junior is the most fundamental principle in the Chinese kinship system’. 
Traditional Chinese ‘foreign policy’ (not a wholly appropriate term for the tribute 
system) during the Ming dynasty was about a benevolent and morally superior 
emperor expecting loyal subordination from others, and reserving the right to 
punish them if they disturbed China’s peace or good order (Zhang, F, 2015: 
202-5). There is support in the literature for the view that this still applies in 
modern foreign policy terms, with Confucian cultures being more inclined to 
hierarchy and bandwagoning than to sovereign equality and balance of power 
(Fairbank, 1968; Huntington, 1996; Kang, 2003, 2003-4, 2005; Kissinger, 
2011: 1-3; Harris, 2014: locs. 362-74. For a critique, see Acharya, 2003-4).  
 
China’s rise now puts the question of hierarchy back onto the agenda of 
international society, especially for Northeast Asia, where China is contesting 
US hegemony. The question is what sort of order China wants in its home 
region if it is successful in pushing the US back? In turn, this raises larger 
questions for GIS about how to handle a possible return of great power 
spheres of influence, and how to make such behaviour fit with the institution of 
sovereign equality. Since 1978 and Deng’s reforms, China has had no strong 
claim to either political or cultural centrality or superiority, so any claim for 
hierarchy or regional primacy will be based mainly on its relative power and 
wealth. Although China might aspire to be a model of authoritarian 
developmental capitalism, it still has a long way to go in establishing a secure 
and stable form of political economy (Pieke, 2016). The evidence suggesting 
that a version of traditional Chinese/Confucian hierarchy is operating in 
Chinese foreign policy thinking, ranges from the current neo-Confucian talk 
from the Chinese party/state about harmonious society, both domestically and 
internationally, to the use of Tianxia as a structuring concept for international 
relations. Such thinking certainly fits both with China’s keenness to deny equal 
status to Japan, its undiplomatic assertions in Southeast Asia about big versus 
small countries, noted above, and its hegemonic behaviour towards Southeast 
Asia (the 9-dash line). In Confucian thinking, social harmony necessarily rests 
on the precondition of stable hierarchy.5 But almost nothing is said about the 
hierarchy side of this equation in China’s contemporary foreign policy rhetoric. 
                                                 
5 It can also be more than that (Pan, 2011).  
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As Callahan (2009) notes, this linkage gives a worryingly imperial/hierarchical 
implication to China’s discourse about harmony, and seems to put it in the 
same camp as Russia: great powers that still seem to be thinking like empires.  
 
The return of Confucian thinking alongside China’s rising power raises a lot of 
interesting questions not only about China, but about the whole East Asian 
region. Paradoxically, China is at the same time, as noted above, a leading 
defender of a traditionally Westphalian view of strong sovereign equality and 
non-intervention. This view is shared equally strongly by most of its neighbours 
and for the same reason: a deep postcolonial reaction against the impositions 
and indignities of Western imperialism, and a consequent commitment to 
sovereign equality and non-intervention as the keys to defending their newly 
won independence. How these seemingly contradictory positions fit together 
has not been much discussed, and needs to be addressed not just by 
academics as a key legacy of China’s history, but also by the politicians who 
promote such contradictory views without understanding the tension and 
distrust that creates. Waltz (1979) was not wrong in his argument that 
hierarchy is a fundamentally different principle of social order from 
anarchy/sovereign equality. From the English School, Watson’s (1992) 
spectrum of international political orders running from anarchy at one end, 
through hegemony, suzerainty and dominion, to empire at the other end also 
offers useful structural insights. Among other things, hierarchical structures, 
with their focus on relative status, generate quite different logics of 
securitization from anarchical ones, with their focus on the absolute status of 
sovereign equality. In principle, a disposition towards hierarchy is 
fundamentally antagonistic to a regime of sovereign equality, and even to a 
regime that allows some ‘legalised hegemony’ for great powers within an 
overall structure of sovereign equality (Simpson, 2004). It seems probable that, 
if it exists, a Chinese disposition towards hierarchy would be differentiated, 
operating more strongly in the Confucian sphere within East Asia, where a 
phrase like ‘return to normality’ would mean some form of suzerainty with 
China at the centre; and less strongly between China and the West, where 
expectations of cultural reciprocity would not be in play. This kind of 
suzerain/hierarchical mind-set is fundamentally at odds with the basic 
construction of GIS. It is small wonder then, that with these contradictory 
principles in play, China’s foreign policy looks confusing – and often 
threatening – to outsiders. This cultural analysis suggests that any likely form 
of government in China would think in the same hierarchical way about ‘the 
return to normality’.  
 
The interplay of these two logics raises various possibilities in reaction to rising 
Chinese power and attempts to assert regional primacy. If Confucian logic 
dominates in East Asia, then a rising and hierarchical China might expect 
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Japan and Southeast Asia to submit to its primacy. But if Westphalian logic 
dominates, then Chinese assertions of primacy will be taken as illegitimate, 
and responded to in anti-imperialist mode with fierce resistance and balancing. 
Those logics will of course be mediated by the power structure, so that even 
Westphalian logic might be over-ridden if China’s relative power became so 
overwhelming that bandwagoning remained the only sensible option. Judging 
by the reactions to China’s increased assertiveness since 2008, Westphalian 
logic has taken deep roots in Japan and Southeast Asia. Unlike the US, China 
is not surrounded by weak powers. Many of its neighbours are, or could quickly 
become, militarily formidable. As I have argued elsewhere (Buzan, 2014b) 
China will disadvantage itself, and help the US quite considerably, if it tries to 
achieve regional primacy by intimidating its neighbours. 
 
 ‘Face’ 
 
‘Face’ is a cultural feature common to Confucian societies, and shapes social 
interactions in ways quite different from those within Western culture (Moore, 
2014). ‘Face’ is a complex concept, relating partly to material accomplishments 
and positional status, and partly to one’s moral standing in one’s community 
(Hu, 1944; Hwang, 2011: 266-81). Ho (1976: 883) defines ‘face’ as:  
the respectability and/or deference which a person can claim for himself 
from others, by virtue of the relative position he occupies in his social 
network and the degree to which he is judged to have functioned 
adequately in that position as well as acceptably in his general conduct; 
the face extended to a person by others is a function of the degree of 
congruence between judgments of his total condition in life, including his 
actions as well as those of people closely associated with him, and the 
social expectations that others have placed upon him. In terms of two 
interacting parties, face is the reciprocated compliance, respect and/or 
deference that each party expects from, and extends to, the other party. 
It is probably a universal cultural phenomenon, but plays differently in different 
societies. In the contemporary West it is mainly about material 
accomplishments and positional status. But before modernity it was more 
about moral standing, closely related to honour. As Ho (1976: 877) points out, 
honour was a type of ‘face’, and a standard of behaviour, largely confined to 
elites, while ‘face’ in the Chinese context applies to everyone. In the West, 
honour has been eroded both by individualism and by the replacement of 
dynastic forms of society, in which it was a major institution, by modern, 
contractual ones, which have pushed it to the margins. Individualism can be 
seen as contradictory to ‘face’ on the grounds that ‘face’ is always given by 
others and so depends deeply on a relational social context and the 
individual’s position in a group. But Ho (1976: 867, 877-83) argues that this 
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separation is not as extreme as might at first appear, and that ‘face’ is a 
universal feature of society, even in individualist societies. 
 
It is an interesting question whether face is somehow a distinctive Northeast 
Asian practice, different in content from what happens elsewhere, or is more or 
less the same practice as elsewhere, but having a much higher prominence 
and intensity in Northeast Asian societies than those elsewhere. Hu (1944) 
argues for the much higher importance of moral standing in the community in 
China. Her analysis puts a great deal of emphasis on the relational linkage 
between ‘face’ on the one hand, and trust, and the importance of society 
structured around collectivism and key referent groups (e.g. family, school, 
local community). As she notes, ‘Much of the activity of Chinese life is 
operated on the basis of trust’ (Hu, 1944: 50). Ho (1976: 883, 867, 873) also 
notes a ‘Chinese orientation, which places the accent on the reciprocity of 
obligations, dependence and esteem protection’, that ‘losing face is a serious 
matter which will, in varying degrees, affect one’s ability to function effectively 
in society’, and that ‘face can be more important than life itself’. These themes 
resonate very strongly with Qin’s (2011) analysis, which also emphasises trust, 
reciprocity and collectivist, hierarchical societies. ‘Face’ and Asian 
relationalism seem to be closely linked, either as different ways of talking about 
the same thing, or with ‘face’ as a particular feature of relationalism in 
Confucian societies.  
 
There are many authors who take ‘face’ very seriously as a core feature of 
Northeast Asia’s international relations, both historical and contemporary 
(Paine, 2003: 257, 306, 349-51; Gries, 2004: loc. 223-255; Shirk, 2007; Wang, 
2012: 7-9, 163-202; Shambaugh, 2013: 55-9; Moore, 2014). If hierarchy and 
‘face’ are as deeply embedded in Chinese thinking as this discussion 
suggests, then as China rises they pose big challenges not just to ES theory, 
but also to the practices that compose GIS. Both characteristics are very 
clearly in play in the disputes in the East China Sea where Japan and China 
quite literally ‘face off’ against each other, and in the South China Sea, where 
China’s ‘face’ and the US’s ‘credibility’ are engaged in a dangerous dance. The 
ES has not thought about ‘face’. Yet ‘face’ might count as a primary institution 
of international society in East Asia. And in a world in which China is one of the 
most powerful states, ‘face’ will almost certainly be an important aspect of 
diplomacy more generally.  
 
Chinese characteristics and ES concepts thus play into each other in ways that 
raise interesting and important questions for both Chinese policy and ES 
scholars. The ES has thought about hierarchy, but only at the margins of its 
mainly anarchic conception of GIS. In practical terms, how is GIS to respond 
when one (China) or more (Russia) of the great powers within it is thinking like 
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an empire? Do hierarchical thinking and ‘face’ concerns in China make it much 
more difficult for the US adjust to its own weakening position, in which it has 
both less material power and less moral authority? Is GIS less sensitive to 
‘face’ issues than it needs to be? Can China resist both the general temptation 
of hubris as its power rises, and its own specific cultural one of reverting to a 
hierarchical ‘Middle Kingdom’ view of the world with itself at the centre, and 
concerns about ‘face’ dominating its relationships? If it cannot resist, how 
should its neighbours and other great powers respond? As China becomes 
powerful, its cultural characteristics will create pressure on some of the key 
institutions of GIS. How well China and the rest of GIS understand these 
pressures, and how well they negotiate them, will have a major impact on 
world order in the coming decades. This is one compelling reason why China 
needs to set out a clearer view of what kind of international societies, both 
regional and global, it wants to promote. Simple opposition to US hegemony 
will not suffice. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The above discussion shows that the ES fits well enough with China to provide 
a distinctive and useful perspective on its rise. Yet it also shows that there are 
areas where ‘Chinese characteristics’ raise theoretical challenges to the 
standard ES theoretical framing. The strengths and weaknesses of ES theory 
in understanding the rise of China can be summarised as follows. 
 
Strengths 
 
 The ES’s historical perspective provides insights into the China that is now 
rising. Not only the philosophy of the pre-Qin period, and the hierarchy of 
the tribute system period, but also the alienation and revanchism from the 
‘century of humiliation’, play importantly into contemporary Chinese foreign 
policy thinking and behaviour.  
 The ES’s analytical tool of primary institutions is useful in three ways: 
o First, it gives a clear and nuanced empirical insight into the question 
of whether rising China is a status quo or revisionist power.  
o Second, it highlights the tensions between China’s hierarchical 
disposition on the one hand, and its apparent firm commitment to 
sovereignty, non-intervention, the balance of power, and great power 
management, on the other. Among other things, this gives leverage 
on explaining the apparent contradictions in Chinese foreign policy; 
and on pointing out the significant differences in securitization logics 
under sovereignty/anarchy and hierarchy. 
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o Third, it identifies ‘face’ as an important part of the normative structure 
of international society within NEA, and between it and the rest of the 
world. 
 The historical and structural approach of the ES raises questions about the 
appropriateness of concepts such as suzerainty when applied to the 
Chinese tribute system, which had a quite different and more cultural 
foundation than the European models of hierarchy. This could become 
important in trying to design concepts to capture the nature of the ‘new 
China’ in contemporary GIS. 
 
Weaknesses 
 
 The ES has perhaps overstated the alienation of China from contemporary 
GIS. This was truer during Mao’s time, but since the late 1970s, China is 
not so much an outlier in GIS, as part of a group divided from the West on 
liberal social and political values. As the influence of the West diminishes, 
China’s fairly mainstream position within GIS will become more obvious. 
 The rising power of China strengthens the case for looking more at 
hierarchical international societies, both regional and global. The ES has 
not yet developed its own understanding of hierarchical international 
societies well enough to be able to deal with a rising great power of a 
hierarchical disposition. But the ES does have resources to deal with this, 
which makes this challenge also an opportunity for developing ES theory 
away from its Westphalian assumptions. The standard ES line is that the 
concept of international society is only relevant for the anarchic side of the 
spectrum because hierarchy removes the multi-actor condition required for 
a society of states. There is now more questioning of this assumption, and a 
rising interest in hegemony (Watson, 1992: 299-309, 319-25; 1997; Gong, 
1984: 7-21; Clark, 1989, 2011a & b; Hurrell, 2007: esp. 13, 35-6, 63-5, 71, 
111-14; Dunne, 2003; Goh, 2008). Both Watson’s spectrum and the 
analysis of classical empires by Buzan and Little (2000: 176-88) suggest 
that there is room for international society well up towards the hierarchical 
end of Watson’s spectrum in which hegemony itself could be a primary 
institution (Clark, 2011a). In most classical empires, the component units 
could have a considerable degree of autonomy, and this made room for 
diplomacy, war, balance of power and other institutions that are hallmarks of 
international society. Seen in dynamic perspective, classical empires often 
look like centralising phases of an international society that will at other 
times take a more decentralised form.  
 The ES perhaps does not take seriously enough the issue of what holds 
societies together raised by Wendt (1999). Now that China is by some 
measures the second, or even first, biggest economy, whether its 
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commitment to the institution of the market is supported by belief or only by 
calculation begins to matter a lot to the stability of this institution.  
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